Mercer Law Review
Volume 65
Number 4 Eleventh Circuit Survey

Article 10

7-2014

Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Rosemary Cakmis

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Cakmis, Rosemary (2014) "Federal Sentencing Guidelines," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 65: No. 4, Article 10.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol65/iss4/10

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Federal Sentencing Guidelines
by Rosemary Cakmis'
In recent years, the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG, or
the Guidelines)' for offenses involving drugs,' immigration,' fraud and
theft," and firearms' have consistently been applied more frequently at
federal sentencings than any other primary offense guidelines.' The

* Senior Litigator, Office of the Federal Defender, Middle District of Florida. University
of Florida (B.S., 1979; J.D., 1981). Member, State Bar of Florida; Board Certified, Criminal
Appeals, State Bar of Florida.
1. Available at Guidelines Manual Archives, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, http//www.ussc
.gov/Guidelines/archives.cfm (last visited July 30, 2014).
2. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (USSG) § 2D1.1 (2013). USSG § 2D1.1
is generally referred to in this Article as "the drug guideline" because it is the most
frequently used guideline in Part D of Chapter Two of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (Manual). See infra note 6.
3. See USSG § 2L1.2 (2013). Chapter Two, Part L, of the Manual contains several
guidelines that are applicable to various offenses. See USSG ch. 2, pt. L (2013). But
because USSG § 2L1.2 is the most frequently used guideline relating to immigration
offenses, it is generally referenced in this Article as "the immigration guideline." See infra
note 6.
4. See USSG § 2B1.1 (2013). Of the guidelines for economic offenses found in Chapter
Two, Part B, of the Manual, USSG § 2B1.1 is used most frequently. See infra note 6.
Therefore, USSG § 2B1.1 is generally referred to in this Article as "the fraud guideline."
5. See USSG § 2K2.1 (2013). USSG § 2K2.1 is but one of the guidelines relating to
firearm offenses found in Chapter Two, Part K, of the Manual. See USSG ch. 2, pt. K
(2013). Notwithstanding, USSG § 2K2.1 is generally referenced in this Article as "the
firearm guideline" in light of its frequent usage. See infra note 6.
6. The United States Sentencing Commission (the Sentencing Commission) collects and
analyzes data on federal sentencing decisions and then reports statistics on guideline
applications at the national, circuit, and district levels in several publications available on
the Sentencing Commission's website. See Publications, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
http://www.ussc.gov/Publicationsrmdex.cfm (last visited July 30, 2014). The statistics
referenced in this Article are from fiscal year 2012. Although the Sentencing Commission
recently reported preliminary data for fiscal year 2013, that data is not used in this Article
because the Sentencing Commission has cautioned that the data should not be considered
final until publication of the annual Sourcebook ofFederal Sentencing Statistics. See U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, 4TH QUARTER RELEASE,
PRELIMINARY FISCAL YEAR 2013 DATA THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 (2013), http//www.
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Guidelines allow for consequential enhancements, many related to
These Guidelines, especially the
victims and criminal history.'
enhancements, dominated the precedential guideline decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 2013. This
Article focuses on the recurring issues in those decisions.
I.

GENERAL APPLICATION PRINCIPLES

While relatively few Eleventh Circuit decisions rule on the constitutionality of the Guidelines directly, almost every Eleventh Circuit
decision reviewing the application of the Guidelines touches upon the

ussc.gov/DataandStatistics/FederalSentencingStatistics/Quarterly-Sentencing-Up
dates/USSC_2013-Quarter_Report4th.pdf.
Relying on data from 75,867 cases in which at least one guideline was applied, Table 17
of the Sentencing Commission's Sourcebook of FederalSentencing Statistics for fiscal year
2012 reveals that the four most frequently used Chapter Two guidelines nationally were
as follows: USSG § 2D1.1 was the primary guideline for 24,299 (32%) of the offenders;
USSG § 2L1.2 was the primary guideline for 19,463 (25.7%) of the offenders; USSG § 2B1. 1
was the primary guideline for 8,701(11.5%) of the offenders; and USSG § 2K2.1 was the
primary guideline for 6,308 (8.3 %)of the offenders. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2012
Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics tbl.17 (17th ed.) [hereinafter 2012 Sourcebook
of Federal Sentencing Statistics], http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/annual-report-and-sourcebooks/2012/sourcebook-2012 (last visited July 30,
2014).
Similarly, drugs, immigration, fraud, and firearms were the four primary offense
categories with the highest percentage of offenders in fiscal year 2012, nationally and in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The chart below reflects those
percentages.
Drugs
Immigration Fraud
Firearms
National
30.2%
32.2%
10.5%
9.8%
Eleventh Circuit
29.9%
13.9%
17.8%
14%
See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Statistical Information Packet, Fiscal Year 2012, Eleventh
Circuit, 1 fig. A [hereinafter 2012 Eleventh Circuit Statistical Information Packet],
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/data-and-statisties/federal-sentencing-sta
tistics/state-district-circuit/2Ol2/llcl2.pdf (last visited July 30, 2014).
7. See, e.g., USSG §§ 2B1.1(b) (setting forth numerous specific offense characteristics,
several of which are victim related), 2D1.1(b) (containing numerous specific offense
characteristics for drug offenses), 2K2.1(a) (providing for offense level enhancements, such
as for prior convictions for crimes of violence), 2L1.2(b) (assigning various offenses levels
depending on certain prior convictions, including crimes of violence and aggravated
felonies), 4B1.1 (2013) (enhancing the offense level and criminal-history category for certain
violent and drug offenders with the requisite prior convictions), and 411.4 (2013)
(enhancing the offense level and criminal history category for firearms offenders with the
requisite prior convictions to satisfy the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e) (2012)).
8. Only the Eleventh Circuit guideline decisions published in 2013 are discussed in this
Article. See 11TH Cm. R. 36-2 (2013) (stating that unpublished decisions are not "binding
precedent").
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protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment,' Sixth Amendment,o or
the Ex Post Facto Clause" of the United States Constitution. An
informed discussion of the 2013 Eleventh Circuit's guideline decisions,
therefore, necessarily includes consideration of certain constitutional
principles underlying the application and interpretation of the Guidelines in federal sentencings and sentencing appeals.
A Sixth Amendment Jury Rial Concerns About Judge-Made
Findings
In United States v. Booker,12 the United States Supreme Court
remedied Sixth Amendment concerns about judge-made findings that
increase the guideline range by stripping the Guidelines of the mandatory role the Guidelines had played in federal sentencings for eighteen
years.13 Post-Booker, sentences are subject to review for procedural and
substantive reasonableness." The most common challenge for procedural reasonableness is improper USSG calculation and application."
The Eleventh Circuit decisions addressing procedural reasonableness are
discussed in Parts II, III, and IV. Substantive reasonableness challenges
are discussed in Part V.
Although the Eleventh Circuit indirectly addressed most Sixth
Amendment concerns in 2013 by applying Booker and its progeny," the
defendant in United States v. Smith challenged his sentence based on
the Sixth Amendment "as applied."" In rejecting that challenge, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that the 420-month sentence was less than the
statutory maximum-life imprisonment-and that the record did not
indicate the sentencing court considered the Guidelines to be mandatory,
as opposed to advisory.'" "In the context of sentencing determinations,"

9. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; see also U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
12. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
13. Id. at 226-27.
14. See id. at 260-65.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 704 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2013) (vacating the
sentence as unreasonable because the sentencing court "misinterpreted the sentencing
guideline enhancement").
16. See, e.g., Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011); Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338 (2007).
17. 741 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2013).
18. Id. at 1214.
19. Id. at 1227; see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 249-65.
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the Eleventh Circuit iterated, "the Sixth Amendment requires nothing
more."20

B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Concerns About Proving Enhancements
Federal sentencing proceedings are "more flexible and less formalized"
than jury trials." "However, the lower standard of proof, the district
court's wide discretion, and the degree of informality in no way lessen
the importance or the due process implications of the event."22
The sentencing court may rely on undisputed facts in the presentence
report,"3 but the government must prove disputed facts by specific and
reliable evidence.' In resolving factual disputes, the preponderance of
the evidence standard applies, but the rules of evidence applicable at
trial do not." And, as the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed in Smith, the

20. Smith, 741 F.3d at 1227. The Eleventh Circuit commented that Smith's holding
was consistent with at least seven other circuits. See id. at 1227 n.5 (citing United States
v. Hernandez, 633 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990,
1017-18 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819,825 (7th Cir. 2009); United
States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 384 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Benkahla,
530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727, 745-46 (10th Cir.
2008); United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 565 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Norman,
465 F. App'x 110, 121 (3d Cir. 2012)).
21. See United States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299, 1306 (11th Cir. 2013) (Bowen, J.,
specially concurring).
22. Id. at 1307; see also United States v. Ghertler, 605 F.3d 1256, 1269 (11th Cir. 2010)
("A defendant has a due process right, however, not to be sentenced based on false or
unreliable information.").
23. See United States v. Philidor, 717 F.3d 883, 885 (11th Cir. 2013).
24. Smith, 741 F.3d at 1227 (citing Ghertler,605 F.3d at 1268); Rodriguez, 732 F.3d at
1305 (majority opinion) ("It is the district court's duty to ensure that the Government
carries this burden by presenting reliable and specific evidence." (quoting United States
v. Lawrence, 47 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1995))); United States v. Washington, 714 F.3d
1358, 1361(11th Cir. 2013) ("When the government seeks to apply an enhancement under
the . . . Guidelines over a defendant's factual objection, it has the burden of introducing
'sufficient and reliable' evidence to prove the necessary facts by a preponderance of the
evidence.").
See also 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2012) (authorizing federal sentencing courts to receive and
consider all information concerning the defendant's background, character, and conduct);
USSG ch. 6, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2013) ("Reliable fact-finding is essential to procedural
due process and to the accuracy and uniformity of sentencing."); USSG § 6A1.3(a) (2013)
("In resolving any dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination,
the court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the
rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of
reliability to support its probable accuracy.").
25. Washington, 714 F.3d at 1361.
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sentencing court may rely on facts about conduct for which the
defendant has been acquitted.26
The importance of these basic due process considerations is illustrated
in United States v. Washington27 and United States v. Rodriguez,"
which are discussed more fully in Part II.A.1. The Eleventh Circuit
reversed the sentences in both cases because the government failed to
submit any actual proof to support the enhancements. 29 The concurring opinion in Rodriguez expressed concern over "(tihe Government's
cavalier disregard for the need of further evidence, specific references to
a trial transcript, or another basis upon which the district court may
make sustainable findings" in resolving the defendant's objection at
sentencing.3 0 "Why the [prosecution] would expend its resources in
extensive, indeed intricate, investigation and prosecution of this case,
only to approach its culmination (the sentencing event) with such laxity,
is a mystery.""
C.

Ex Post Facto Concerns About Which Guideline Manual To Use
Most Eleventh Circuit guideline decisions note the edition of the
United States Guideline Manual (the Guidelines Manual)being used."
A new edition comes out every year because the United States Sentencing Commission (the Sentencing Commission) constantly amends the
Guidelines."

26. Smith, 741 F.3d at 1226; see also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997)
(holding that a "verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering
conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a
preponderance of the evidence").
27. 714 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2013).
28. 732 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2013).
29. See Washington, 714 F.3d at 1359; Rodriguez, 732 F.3d at 1301.
30. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d at 1306 (Bowen, J., specially concurring).
31. Id.
32. In light of Ex Post Facto concerns, the Eleventh Circuit referred to various editions
of the Guidelines Manualin the decisions discussed in this Article. Some of the guidelines
and commentary cited in the decisions have been renumbered in subsequent manuals, but
are otherwise unchanged. To maintain consistency and ease of reference, unless the
guideline provision has changed substantively, all guideline provisions cited in this Article
refer to the section numbers designated in the 2013 edition of the GuidelinesManual. In
like manner, all statutes are cited to the 2013 version, unless it is substantively different
from the version in effect at the relevant time. Cf. Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI, 709
F.3d 1328, 1337 n.5 (11th Cir. 2013) ("Though we technically examine the statute as it
existed at the time of the relevant conviction, for ease of access we cite throughout this
opinion to the present statute, unless the statute or statutes of conviction have been
revised in relevant part since the time of Turner's conviction for that offense.").
33. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)-(p) (2012) (requiring the Sentencing Commission
to review and revise the Guidelines periodically).
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As a general rule, USSG § 1B1.11(a)" requires that sentencing courts
use the Guidelines Manual that is in effect when the defendant is
sentenced.35 That Guidelines Manual, however, could contain more
severe guideline provisions than the Guidelines Manual that was in
effect when the offense was committed, especially in light of the 799
3
Such circumstances
times the Guidelines have been amended.*
implicate the exception to the general rule, allowing for the earlier
Guidelines Manual to be used if using the GuidelinesManual in effect
at sentencing would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause."
Notwithstanding this exception, the circuits were split on whether the
Ex Post Facto Clause applies in the context of the now-advisory
Guidelines." In 2013, the United States Supreme Court resolved that
split. In Peugh v. United States," the Court held that "[a] retrospective
increase in the Guidelines .

.

. [that are] applicable to a defendant

creates a sufficient risk of a higher sentence to constitute an ex post
facto violation."40
In holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to the now-advisory
Guidelines, the Supreme Court expounded upon Booker, as well as the
subsequent cases clarifying the role of the Guidelines in federal
sentencings." Emphasizing the significance of that role, the Court
observed that "[elven after Booker rendered the .. . Guidelines advisory,
district courts have in the vast majority of cases imposed either
within-Guidelines sentences or sentences that depart downward from the
Guidelines on the Government's motion."' The Supreme Court also
stressed that the Sixth Amendment test, as applied in Booker, and the
Ex Post Facto Clause test, as applied in Peugh, are "analytically

34. USSG § 1B1.11(a) (2013).
35. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4XA)(ii) (2013) (instructing sentencing courts to use
the Guidelines "in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced").
36. See generally USSG app. C (2013).
37. See USSG § 1B1.11(b).
38. Compare United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2006), with United
States v. Wetherald, 636 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2011).
39. 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013).
40. Id. at 2084 (emphasis omitted).
41. Id. at 2079-80, 2083, 2088.
42. Id. at 2084 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing
Statistics,63 fig. G (2011 16th ed.)). Similar statistics are reflected nationally and for the
Eleventh Circuit for Fiscal Year 2012. See Statistical Information Packet, Fiscal Year
2012, Eleventh Circuit, supra note 6, tbl. 8 (reflecting that 52.4% of the sentences
nationally and 58.7% of the sentences in the Eleventh Circuit were within the guideline
range).

977

2014]1

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

distinct."

Ergo, the Court concluded, "[niothing that we say today

'undo[es]' the holding[] of Booker .

.

. or our other recent sentencing

cases.""
II.

BASIC ECONOIC OFFENSES, CHAPTER TWO, PART B,
OF THE GUIDELINES MANUAL

Part B of Chapter Two in the Guidelines Manual sets forth the
guidelines for various economic offenses such as fraud, theft, and
As illustrated below, the Eleventh Circuit dedicated a
robbery."
substantial portion of its guidelines precedent in 2013 to interpreting
those guidelines, particularly the victim-related enhancements. The
import of those enhancements prompted the court to remark recently,
"[s] ometimes a number is just a number, but when the number at issue
triggers an enhancement under the [ Guidelines, that number matters. 4 6
Fraudand Theft Offense Enhancements, USSG § 2B1.1
During the past five years, the percentage of federal offenders
sentenced for fraud and theft offenses under USSG § 2B1.1" in the
Eleventh Circuit has risen, while the national percentage has remained
fairly consistent." And in the past five years, the average sentence
and average guideline minimum for offenders sentenced under USSG
§ 2B1.1 have increased, while the number of within-guideline sentences
has decreased.

A.

43. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2088 (contrasting the Sixth Amendment's focus on "when a
given finding of fact is required to make a defendant legally eligible for a more severe
penalty" with the Ex Post Facto Clause's focus on "whether a change in law creates a
'significant risk' of a higher sentence; here, whether a sentence in conformity with the new
Guidelines is substantially likely").
44. Id.
45. USSG ch. 2, pt. B (2013).
46. Washington, 714 F.3d at 1359 (internal citations omitted).
47. USSG § 2B1.1.
48. Compare Statistical Information Packet, Fiscal Year 2012, Eleventh Circuit, supra
note 6, tbl. A with U.S. Sentencing Comm'n Statistical Information Packet, Fiscal Year
2011, Eleventh Circuit, tbl. A (2011), http://www.ussc.gov/sitesldefault/files/pdf/data-andstatistics/federal-sentencing-statisticstate-district-circuit/2011I11c11.pdf.http*//www.us
sc.gov/sites/default/filespdf/data-and-statistics/federal-sentencing-statisticistate-districtcircuit/2010/11c10.pdf, http/A/www.usse.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/data-and-statistics/federalsentencing-statisticstate-district-circuit/2009/11c09.pdf, http//www.ussc.gov/sites/default
/files/pdffdataand-statistics/federal-sentencing-statistic/state-district-circuit/2008/11cG8.pdfI
49. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, Quick Facts:Theft, PropertyDestruction,andFraud
Offenses (2013) [hereinafter Quick Facts:Theft, PropertyDestruction,and FraudOffenses),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/QuickFacts/QuickFactsTheftPropertyDestruction.

978

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

USSG § 2B1.1, which has been modified by forty-seven amendments
since it went into effect in 1987,50 contains nineteen specific-offensecharacteristic enhancements with multiple subparts." In 2013, the
Eleventh Circuit decided issues related to four of those enhancements,
namely, the enhancements for the number of victims,52 amount of
loss," use of sophisticated means," and use of device-making equipment."s Also, the court addressed the enhancement for abusing a
position of trust,56 which is found in Chapter Three, as opposed to in
the specific offense characteristics listed in USSG § 2B1.1(b); but it was
applied to increase 15.6% of th6 sentences calculated under the fraud
guidelines in 2012."
1. Enhancements for Number of Victims, USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2)
and Amount of Loss, USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1). USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2) 8
includes a two-level enhancement if the offense involved at least ten

Fraud.pdf. Notably, the Sentencing Commission also reported that of the five federal
districts with the most USSG § 2B1.1 offenders, two were within the jurisdiction of the
Eleventh Circuit in fiscal year 2012 the Middle and Southern Districts of Florida. Id.
50. See USSG app. C, amends. 7, 99-101, 303, 312, 317, 361, 364, 393, 481, 482, 512,
551, 576, 596, 617, 637, 638, 646, 647, 653-655, 661, 665, 666, 674, 679, 685, 696, 699, 700,
702, 714, 719, 725, 726, 733, 737, 745, 747, 749, 761 (1987-2013).
51. See USSG § 2B1.1(b).
52. See id. § 2B1.1(b)(2) (providing graduated enhancements depending on the number
of victims).
53. See id. § 2B1.1(b)(1) (providing graduated enhancements depending on the amount
of loss).
54. See id. § 2B1.1(b)(10) (providing an enhancement for offenses involving sophisticated means).
55. See id. § 2B1.1(bXll) (providing an enhancement for using device-making
equipment).
56. See id. § 3B1.3(b) (2013) (adding two levels "[ilf the defendant abused a position of
public or private trust . . . in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or
concealment of the offense").
57. See Quick Factson Theft, PropertyDestruction,and FraudOffenses, supra note 49.
Generally speaking, the abuse-of-trust enhancement was applied more frequently than any
other Chapter Three enhancement under USSG § 3B1.2. See 2012 Sourcebook of Federal
Sentencing Statistics, supra note 6, tbl. 10. The enhancement for obstruction of justice,
found in USSG § 3C1.1, is the next most frequently applied Chapter Three enhancement.
USSG § 3C1.1 (2013). Other than the abuse-of-trust enhancement, the only other Chapter
Three enhancement addressed in 2013 Eleventh Circuit precedent was the obstruction-ofjustice enhancement. See United States v. McKinley, 732 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2013)
(affirming enhancement and observing that "while a defendant has a right to testify on his
own behalf, the Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that 'a defendant's right to
testify does not include a right to commit perjury'") (quoting United States v. Dunnigan,
507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993)).
58. USSG § 2B1.1(bX2).
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victims or was committed through mass-marketing." If, however, the
60
offense involved at least fifty victims, four levels are added. If 250 or
more victims were involved, six levels are added." According to the
Sentencing Commission, 22.8% of the sentences based on USSG § 2B1.1
in 2012 were enhanced for the number of victims. 62 Hence, the
significant number of decisions relating to that enhancement should
come as no surprise. The Eleventh Circuit interpreted various nuances
in the definition of "victim" in three of those decisions.6 3 In two other
decisions, as noted in Part I.B, the court reversed sentences based on the
insufficient proof of the actual number of victims involved.64
The commentary to USSG § 2B1.1 generally defines "victim" as a
corollary of loss, that is, a "victim" is an individual or business "who
sustained any part of the actual loss determined under [USSG § 2B1.1This seemingly simple definition is complicated by the
(b)(1)]."6
Guidelines' lengthy commentary explicating the loss determination
under USSG § 2B1.1(b) and providing "Special Rules" that only apply in
certain circumstances." The application of two such provisions divided

the court in United States v. Bane.67
The defendant in Bane appealed his health-care-fraud sentence,
arguing that the sentencing court should have credited the medical
supplies he actually provided against the loss amount, and, consequently, the number of victims.68 The dissent and the defendant agreed that
credit was appropriate based on the general commentary that allows for
credit against loss for property returned to victims in certain circumstances.
The majority, on the other hand, relied on the Guidelines' Special
Rules commentary applicable to certain misrepresentation schemes in
which a government agency's regulatory approval of goods was required
but was not obtained or was fraudulently obtained.o In such cases, the
commentary provides that the "loss shall include the amount paid for the

59. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A).
60. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B).
61. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2XC).
62. See Quick Facts: Theft, Property Destruction,and FraudOffenses, supra note 49.
63. See United States v. Bane, 720 F.3d 818 (11th Cir. 2013); Philidor,717 F.3d 883;
Hall, 704 F.3d 1317.
64. See supra PartI.B.
65. USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1.
66. See id. § 2B1.1 cmt. nn.3-4.
67. 720 F.3d 818 (11th Cir. 2013).
68. Id. at 822 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,287, 371, 1001, 1347 (2012)).
69. Id. at 832 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 824-25 (majority opinion) (citing on USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(v)(III)).
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property, services or goods transferred, rendered, or misrepresented,
with no credit provided for the value of those items or services."" The
majority in Bane thus ruled that the value of medical supplies the
defendant actually provided to patients for genuine medical needs was
properly included in the loss calculations." Further, the supplemental
insurance companies who were paying for some of the fraudulent orders
were properly counted as "victims" under the Guidelines because the
payments for those supplies were part of the "actual loss."7
The dissent disagreed, explaining that the Guidelines' Special Rules
commentary that the majority relied upon "is best seen as governing
special cases in which items or goods or services (e.g., drugs or medical
devices) are sold or provided or placed on the market without obtaining
the required prior approval of a government agency (e.g., the Food and
Drug Administration)." 4 That commentary, according to the dissent,
could not apply in Bane, because "regulatory approval by any government agency" was not required for the defendant to submit claims for
reimbursement for the medical supplies he provided to the patients.
In response, the majority posited that no such limitation is contained
in the plain language of the commentary or in the decisions from other
circuits.76 Moreover, in the majority's view, allowing for such credit
here would "undermine the emphasis on the integrity of the regulatory
approval process reflected in the Sentencing Commission's inclusion of
this [Special Rule]." The enhancements for the number of victims and
the amount of loss were therefore affirmed."
The Guidelines expand the definition of "victim" in fraud cases
involving means of identification, such as United States v. Hall.7" A
"means of identification" is "any name or number that may be used,
alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific

71. Id. at 824 (emphasis in original) (quoting USSG § 211.1 cmt. n.3(F)(v)(II)).
72. Id. at 825.
73. Id. at 825-26.
74. Id. at 832 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 825 n.5 (majority opinion).
77. Id. (noting that the purpose of the guideline commentary is to reflect "the
importance of the regulatory approval process to public health, safety, and confidence" in
sentences for regulatory offenses) (citing USSG app. C, amend. 617 (2001)).
78. Id. at 824-27. The court, however, vacated and remanded the restitution order,
holding that restitution should not include the value of the medically necessary goods
provided to the victims. Id. at 827-29. The court also vacated the fine because it exceeded
the amount authorized by the facts the jury necessarily found in convicting the defendant.
Id. at 829-31 (citing S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2357 (2012) (applying
the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to fines in criminal cases)).
79. 704 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2013).
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individual."so In Hall, the Eleventh Circuit answered a novel question
concerning the meaning of the guideline commentary that includes as a
"victim" of a means-of-identification fraud, "any individual whose means
of identification was used unlawfully or without authority."8 '
The defendant in Hall sold the identifying information of 141
individuals to another party, who obtained fraudulent credit cards with
the information of 12 of those individuals.82 Those 12 individuals'
means of identification were clearly "used," making those individuals
"victims" for purposes of the number-of-victims enhancement.' The
remaining 129 individuals, however, were not "victims," according to the
Eleventh Circuit, because their means of identification would not be used
until the co-conspirators secured the fraudulent credit cards with it."
The Eleventh Circuit thus vacated the four-level enhancement for more
than 50 victims and remanded for resentencing based on the two-level
enhancement for more than 10 victims."
In United States v. Philidor," another "means of identification"
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted a different aspect of the
guideline commentary defining a means-of-identification-fraud "victim,"
in particular, the requirement that the "means of identification shall be
of an actual (i.e., not fictitious) individual." Conceding that they used
at least 250 stolen Social Security numbers to file for and receive at
least 250 income tax refund checks, the defendants nonetheless argued
that the government had not proved that the Social Security numbers
were authentic and belonged to "actual, living victims."
The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the guideline commentary to require
that the "victim" be a "real" or "actual" person, as opposed to a "fictitious" person. 9 The court then opined that it was reasonable to infer
that the stolen Social Security numbers belonged to real persons. 0 The
court based its opinion on "common sense and ordinary human
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7) (2012); see also USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 (applying the meaning
of "means of identification" found in 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7) to the fraud guideline, "except
that such means of identification shall be of an actual (i.e., not fictitious) individual").
81. Hall, 704 F.3d at 1321 (emphasis omitted) (quoting USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.4(E)).
82. Id. at 1319.
83. Id. at 1321.
84. Id. at 1323.
85. Id.
86. 717 F.3d 883 (2013).
87. Id. at 886 (quoting USSG § 2B1.1, cmt. n.1). The defendants in Philidor were
sentenced for conspiracy and theft of government funds. 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 641; see
Philidor,717 F.3d at 884.
88. Philidor, 717 F.3d at 884-85.
89. Id. at 886.
90. Id. at 885-86.
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experience, that the Internal Revenue Service verifies identifying
information, like Social Security numbers, before issuing a tax refund."' The Eleventh Circuit, however, rejected the argument that an
actual person must be alive, given that "the plain meaning of the phrase
'actual' does not distinguish between living and deceased persons."92
Instead of deciding Rodriguez and Washington by interpreting another
nuance in the number-of-victims enhancement-as in Bane, Hall, and
Philidor-theEleventh Circuit decided Rodriguez and Washington based
on the insufficiency of the proof of the number of victims." In Rodriguez, the government proffered evidence regarding the number-of-victims
enhancement by way of a summary chart without offering testimony or
evidence to establish the authenticity or accuracy of the chart.
Additionally, the government presented no testimony or evidence to link
the chart to any trial evidence, although the sentencing court could have
considered evidence from the defendant's trial in connection with the
sentencing enhancement.9" "In essence," the Eleventh Circuit stated,
"the summary chart amounted to little more than an allegation by the
government on a piece of paper" that the offense involved the requisite
number of victims to support the enhancement." As such, the chart
was insufficient to establish the number-of-victims enhancement, and,
accordingly, the sentence was reversed in Rodriguez."
Similarly, the proof the sentencing court relied on in Washington
consisted of the government's statement that 250 or more victims were
involved; yet the government presented no evidence as to the victims'
identities." Additionally, the sentencing court relied on the fact that
it had applied the enhancement in sentencing the defendant's coconspirators."
Setting aside the enhancement in Washington, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the government's statement was insufficient to prove the
The court iterated that "absent a stipulation or
enhancement."

91. Id.
92. Id. at 886.
93. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d at 1305; Washington, 714 F.3d at 1361-62.
94. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d at 1305.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1305-06.
97. 714 F.3d at 1361-62. Timing was important in Washington because the defendant
had joined the fraud scheme months after it began, and thus he could not "be held
accountable for conduct that occurred prior to his entry into the joint criminal undertaking." Id. at 1362 (quoting United States v. Hunter, 323 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2003)
(citing USSG § 101.3 cmt. n.2 (2013)).
98. Id. at 1362.
99. Id. at 1362-63.
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agreement between the parties, an attorney's factual assertions at a
sentencing hearing do not constitute evidence that a district court can
rely on."' 00 Moreover, the court explained, when a defendant objects,
"evidence presented at the trial [or sentencing hearing] of another may
not-without more-be used to fashion a defendant's sentence" because
the defendant must be afforded "the opportunity to rebut the evidence
The "more" required
or generally to cast doubt upon its reliability."'
to consider such evidence, the Eleventh Circuit commented, could easily
have been supplied if the government had simply ordered the transcripts
of the co-conspirators' sentencing hearings and made them available to
the defendant and the sentencing court.0 2
Having concluded that the number-of-victims enhancement was not
supported by the record in Washington, the Eleventh Circuit refused to
exercise its discretion to grant the government's request for a "second
bite of the apple" to allow it to prove the number of victims on reThe court explained that nothing prevented the government
mand.'
from presenting evidence at the original sentencing, and "a party who
bears the burden on a contested sentencing issue will generally not get
to try again on remand if its evidence is found to be insufficient on
appeal." 0 4
2. Sophisticated-Means Enhancement, USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C).
If the fraud "involved sophisticated means," two offense levels are added
under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C).' 0 The guideline commentary defines
"'sophisticated means' [as] especially complex or especially intricate
offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an
offense."'
According to the Sentencing Commission, 12.7% of the

100. Id. at 1361 (citing United States v. Onofre-Segarra, 126 F.3d 1308, 1310-11(11th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1355, 1356 (11th Cir. 1989)); see also
Rodriguez, 732 F.3d at 1305 (citing Washington, 714 F.3d at 1361).
101. Washington, 714 F.3d at 1362 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
United States v. Castellanos, 904 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1990)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. USSG § 2B1.1(bX10)(C). USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10) provides a two-level enhancement
if "(A) the defendant relocated, or participated in relocating, a fraudulent scheme to
another jurisdiction to evade law enforcement or regulatory officials; (B) a substantial part
of a fraudulent scheme was committed from outside the United States; or (C) the offense
otherwise involved sophisticated means." USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10). If less than a level twelve
results, however, the level is increased to twelve. Id.
106. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B). Examples of sophisticated means include "locating the
main office of the scheme in one jurisdiction but locating soliciting operations in another
jurisdiction" and "hiding assets or transactions, or both, through the use of fictitious

984

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

defendants sentenced under USSG § 2B1.1 were enhanced for using
sophisticated means in 2012.107 In Bane, the Eleventh Circuit explained that the "proper focus" for determining whether the offense
involves sophisticated means "is on the offense conduct as a whole, not
on each individual step."0 s The court thus affirmed the enhancement
in Bane because the offense conduct "involved repetitive, coordinated
conduct designed to allow [the defendant] to execute his fraud and evade
detection."'0 O
3. Device-Making Equipment Enhancement, USSG § 2B1.1(b)
(11)(A)(i). Another two levels are added under USSG § 2B1.1(bX11)
(A)(i) 0 if the fraud involved the possession or use of "device-making
In United States v. Cruz,"' the Eleventh Circuit
equipment.""'
issued its first published opinion addressing the interplay between that
enhancement and the aggravated identity-theft guideline, USSG
§ 2B1.6,1 which prohibits the application of certain enhancements in
the fraud guideline."' Aggravated identity theft is the unauthorized
transfer, possession, or use of another person's means of identification,
during or in relation to certain predicate crimes."' A conviction for
aggravated identity theft carries a mandatory term of imprisonment that

entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial accounts." Id.
107. See Quick Factson Theft, PropertyDestruction, and FraudOffenses, supra note
49.
108. Bane, 720 F.3d at 826 (citing United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1199
(11th Cir. 2011)).
109. Id. at 827.
110. USSG § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i) (2013).
111. The device-making-equipment enhancement, currently found in USSG
§ 2B1.1(bX11), provides:
If the offense involved (A) the possession or use of any (i) device-making
equipment, or (ii) authentication feature; (B) the production or trafficking of any
(i) unauthorized access device or counterfeit access device, or (ii) authentication
feature; or (CXi) the unauthorized transfer or use of any means of identification
unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of identification, or (ii) the
possession of 5 or more means of identification that unlawfully were produced
from, or obtained by the use of, another means of identification, increase by 2
levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 12, increase to level 12.
USSG § 2B1.1(b)(11). In United States v. Cruz, 713 F.3d 600 (11th Cir. 2013), the court
referred to USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10) because that is where the enhancement was found in the
version of the Guidelines Manual used at the defendant's sentencing. Id. at 601 n.1;
compare USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10) (2010), with § 2B1.1(bX11) (2013). All references in this
article are to the 2013 edition of the Guidelines Manual. See supra note 32.
112. 713 F.3d 600 (11th Cir. 2013).
113. See USSG § 2B1.6 (2013).
114. Cruz, 713 F.3d at 605.
115. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2012).
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is statutorily required to run consecutive to the sentence on the
predicate crimes.116 The identity-theft guideline provides that this
sentence is the sentence required by U.S.C. § 1028A.117
The defendants in Cruz were convicted of aggravated identity theft
and access-device fraud; the access-device fraud was the predicate crime
for the aggravated identity theft. The defendants were sentenced to the
statutorily mandated two-year term of imprisonment on the aggravated
identity-theft convictions, consecutive to the sentence imposed for the
access-device-fraud convictions. Pursuant to the fraud guideline, the
device-making-equipment enhancement was applied in calculating the
guideline range for the access-device fraud. The defendants appealed,
arguing that the guideline commentary for the aggravated identity-theft
guideline prohibits application of the device-making-equipment
enhancement in the fraud guideline."'8
The first sentence of that guideline commentary "straightforwardly"
provides that when sentencing a defendant for aggravated identity theft
and the predicate crime, "any specific offense characteristic for the
transfer, possession, or use of a means of identification" is not to be
applied in calculating the sentence for the predicate crime." 9 The
defendants' sentences in Cruz were enhanced for device-making
equipment, not for conduct involving a means of identification.' 20 The
defendants therefore relied on the next sentence in the commentary,
which explains, "[a] sentence under [this guideline] accounts for this
factor for the underlying offense of conviction, including any such
enhancement that would apply based on conduct for which the defendant
is accountable" under the relevant conduct guideline.12' The defendants thus argued that because the use of device-making equipment was
part of the relevant conduct for the access-card-fraud crimes, the
enhancement under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i) was prohibited.' 22
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, stating that "[a] plain reading of the
commentary makes clear that the use of device-making equipment is not
the type of relevant conduct" addressed by the commentary.'2s The
Eleventh Circuit explained that when read in context, the relevant
conduct referenced in the commentary "is dependent on, and narrowed

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
See USSG § 2B1.6.
Cruz, 713 F.3d at 602.
Id. at 607 (quoting USSG § 2B1.6 cmt. n.2); see also 18 U.S.C.
Cruz, 713 F.3d at 607.
Id. (quoting USSG § 2B1.6 cmt. n.2).
See id; see also USSG § 2B1.6 cmt. n.2.
Cruz, 713 F.3d at 606.

§ 1028A.
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by," the term "this factor."" As such, the commentary only includes
"relevant conduct pertaining to 'this factor'-that is, 'the transfer,
possession, or use of a means of identification."'"" Accordingly, the
court affirmed the device-making-equipment enhancement in Cruz.126
4. Abuse of Trust Enhancement, USSG § 3B1.3.' 2 1 In Cruz, the
Eleventh Circuit also issued its first published opinion on an unusual
aspect of the enhancement for abusing a position of trust-the meaning
of "position" as defined in the guideline commentary.'2 8 One defendant
in Cruz argued that her position as a store cashier, with no discretion,
did not qualify as a "position of public or private trust" for purposes of
the abuse of trust enhancement. The defendant relied on the guideline
commentary that defines such a "position" as being "characterized by
professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary
judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference)." 2 9 In
affirming the sentence in Cruz, the Eleventh Circuit relied on different
guideline commentary, which provides that, notwithstanding the above
definition, the enhancement applies if the defendant "exceeds or abuses
the authority of his or her position in order to obtain, transfer, or issue
unlawfully, or use without authority, any means of identification." 30
The Eleventh Circuit determined that this commentary covered the
defendant's conduct, which included helping her co-conspirators use
credit cards without authorization and using the products of identity
theft for personal gain."
B. Robbery Offense Enhancements, USSG § 2B3.1
Like the fraud guideline, the guideline applicable to robbery offenses,
USSG § 2B3. 1,132 contains a number of specific offense characteristics
that increase the offense level."as In 2013, the Eleventh Circuit
published two opinions delineating what conduct qualifies as physically

124. Id. at 607.
125. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting USSG § 2B1.6 cmt. n.2).
126. Id.
127. USSG § 3B1.3 (2013).
128. Cruz, 713 F.3d at 602, 608.
129. Id. at 608 (quoting USSG § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1).
130. Id. (quoting USSG § 3B1.3 cmt. n.2(B)).
131. Id. at 609. Because these actions fell within the conduct addressed in the
guideline commentary, the Eleventh Circuit found it unnecessary to address the
defendant's arguments regarding her lack of discretion in her position at Target or her lack
of a fiduciary relationship with the victims. Id.
132. USSG § 2B3.1 (2013).
133. Compare USSG § 2BL.1(b), with USSG § 2B3.1(b).
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restraining a person, resulting in a two-level enhancement under USSG
§ 2B3.1(b)(4)(B),' 4 as opposed to abducting the person, resulting in a
four-level enhancement under USSG § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A).s3 5
1. Physical-Restraint Enhancement, USSG § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).
The Guidelines define "physically restrained [as] the forcible restraint
of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up."'a The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the physical restraint enhancement in United
States v. Victor,'37 even though the defendant did not tie, bind, lock up,
or otherwise touch the victim."' The court explained that the conduct
covered by the enhancement is not limited to the examples in the
guideline commentary.'"' Rather, the physical-restraint enhancement
applies to the conduct that ensured the victim would comply and that
effectively prevented the victim from escaping.140 In affirming the
enhancement in Victor, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
defendant physically restrained the victim by threatening her with what
she believed was a gun to prevent her from escaping.141 Whether the
defendant actually had a gun or actually moved the victim was
irrelevant.142
2.
Abduction Enhancement, USSG § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A). The
Guidelines define "abducted" as meaning "a victim was forced to
accompany an offender to a different location."'
In United States v.
Whatley,'" the Eleventh Circuit reversed the sentence where the
defendant simply forced the victims to move within a single bank
building.145 While declining to announce a categorical bar on the
abduction enhancement any time the victim remained in a single

134. USSG § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).
135. See USSG § 2B3.1(b)(4).
136. USSG § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(K) (2013); see also USSG § 2B3.1 cmt. n.1 (stating that
"physical restraint" is defined in USSG § 1B1.1).
137. 719 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2013).
138. Id. at 1290.
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1518-19 (11th Cir. 1994)); see also
United States v. Whatley, 719 F.3d 1206, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 2013).
141. Victor, 719 F.3d at 1290.
142. Id.
143. USSG § 111.1 cmt. n.1(A); see also USSG § 2B3.1 cmt. n.1 (stating that "abducted"
is defined in USSG § 1B1.1). As an example, the Guidelines state that "a bank robber's
forcing a bank teller from the bank into a getaway car would constitute an abduction."
USSG § 111.1 cmt. n.1(A).
144. 719 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2013).
145. Id. at 1221-23.
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building, the Eleventh Circuit opined that the "ordinary meaning" of a
"different location" would not include each individual office or room in
the bank."' To hold otherwise "would blur the distinction between
physical restraint and abduction.""
The Eleventh Circuit thus set
aside the abduction enhancement in Whatley and remanded for
resentencing based on the physical restraint enhancement instead.'
III.

DRUG OFFENSES: ENHANCEMENTS AND REDUCTIONS,
USSG §§ 2D1.1, 5C1.2149
In the Eleventh Circuit, as well as nationally, sentencing courts apply
the primary guideline for drug offenses, USSG § 2D1.1,"5 0 more
frequently than any other Chapter Two guideline."5 ' Similar to 21
5 the drug guideline sets
U.S.C. § 841(b),"'
forth a graduated scale of
penalties, depending on the type and quantity of the drug involved.'s
Cocaine base, commonly called crack, is frequently encountered in
Eleventh Circuit cases. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA),"' and
the corresponding guideline amendments,' 5 drastically overhauled the
Guidelines and statutory provisions relating to crack offenses.'
In
2013, the Eleventh Circuit continued to address issues of first impression concerning the new statutory penalties,"' as well as the retroactive application of the amended crack guideline, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2).'

146. Id. at 1222.
147. Id. at 1223.
148. Id.
149. USSG § 5C1.2 (2013).
150. USSG § 2D1.1 (2013).
151. See supra note 6.
152. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012).
153. Compare id. U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)-(C), with USSG § 2D1.1(c).
154. Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).
155. See USSG app. C, amends. 748 (2010), 750 (2011).
156. See USSG app. C, amend. 750 [hereinafter Amendment 750]; compare Fair
Sentencing Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-425, 122 Stat. 4828 (2008), and USSG § 2D1.1(c)
(2009), with Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA), 124 Stat. 2372, and USSG § 2D1.1(c)
(2011).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Hinds, 713 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that the
lower mandatory minimum term in the FSA applied to a defendant who was re-sentenced
after the FSA took effect); United States v. McIntosh, 704 F.3d 894, 909 (11th Cir. 2013)
("(Tlhe FSA's revised penalties apply to defendants sentenced after the FSA's effective date,
even if their offenses occurred prior to that date.").
158. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012). See, e.g., United States v. Hargrove, 732 F.3d 1253
(11th Cir. 2013) (holding that a defendant subject to a statutory mandatory minimum is
eligible for reduction of sentence under Amendment 750 when he was sentenced above that
minimum and a retroactive guidelines amendment lowers the high end of his applicable
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Regardless of the type of drug involved, if the drug offense involved a
firearm, several Guidelines provisions come into play. Firearm
possession is a specific-offense characteristic under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1).es Therefore, offenses involving drugs, as well as the illegal
possession of firearms, such as firearm possession by a convicted
felon, 160 are grouped in accordance with Chapter Three, Part D, of the
6
' Given that USSG § 2D1.1 generally produces
Guidelines Manual.1
the higher offense level, the drug guideline usually subsumes the firearm
guideline calculations. 16 2 - Such was the case in United States v.
Carillo-Ayala.163 In Carillo-Ayala,the Eleventh Circuit was confronted
with an issue of first impression involving the interaction between the
firearm enhancement in USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1)16 and the "safety valve"
reduction under USSG § 501.2165 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).e166 The
"safety valve" allows for a sentence below the mandatory minimum
penalties contained in most federal drug statutes,17 which trump the
Guidelines and the other sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.

guidelines range); United States v. Hamilton, 715 F.3d 328 (11th Cir. 2013) (reversing
denial of sentencing reduction under Amendment 750 and remanding to allow the district
court to determine whether it originally held the defendant accountable for 8.4 grams of
crack or more); United States v. Hippolyte, 712 F.3d 535 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that a
crack cocaine offender sentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum in 1996 was not
eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 750);
United States v. Colon, 707 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that a crack offender who
received a downward variance at her original sentencing could not receive a sentence
reduction under Amendment 750, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)). If the Guidelines
amendments proposed for 2014 and the bills pending in Congress are any indication, more
changes are on the horizon. See, e.g., Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014, S.B. 1410, 113th
Cong. .(2013).
159. USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1).
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).
161. See USSG ch. 3, pt. D (2013); USSG § 3D1.2(c) (2013).
162. Compare USSG § 2D1.1, with USSG § 3D1.3 (2013).
163. 713 F.3d 82, 86 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) (observing that the firearm offense was
grouped with the drug offense because possession of a firearm was a specific offense
characteristic under the drug guideline, and the drug guideline produced the higher
guideline range).
164. See USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) (adding two offense levels if "a dangerous weapon
(including a firearm) was possessed"). The other often-encountered enhancement in drug
cases concerns prior convictions. See USSG § 4B1.1 (2013). Because similar enhancements
apply in firearm and immigration offenses, the cases relating to prior conviction enhancements are discussed together in Part IV of this Article, infra.
165. USSG § 5C1.2 (2013).
166. 713 F.3d at 85; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012); USSG § 5C1.2(a).
167. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); USSG § 5C1.2(a).
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§ 3553(a).'e

Moreover, the safety valve allows for a two-level reducSafety valve relief is premised on five criteria set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(f) and USSG § 5C1.2.170 The criterion at issue in
Carillo-Ayala requires that the defendant "did not ... possess a firearm
. . . in connection with the offense."17 ' The interplay between the
safety valve's criterion that no firearm be possessed and the drug
guideline's enhancement for possession of a firearm poses "an all too
frequent conundrum" for sentencing courts. 172
Addressing that conundrum in Carillo-Ayala, the Eleventh Circuit
held that application of the firearm enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) does not necessarily preclude safety valve relief under USSG
§ 5C1.2 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)."1 The court emphasized the different
language in the enhancement and reduction provisions, observing that
the safety valve refers to a firearm possessed "in connection with the
offense," whereas the firearm enhancement simply requires that the
tion."

168. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2012); see also Carillo-Ayala,713 F.3d at 88
("A mandatory minimum sentence trumps an advisory Guideline calculation and the
various factors considered by district courts under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)."); United States v.
Hoffman, 710 F.3d 1228, 1233-34 (11th Cir. 2013) ("The district court remains bound by
statutory mandatory minimum sentences, even post-Booker.... The district court was
statutorily required to sentence [the defendant] to life, regardless of the other [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) factors.").
169. See USSG § 2D1.1(b)(16).
170. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); USSG § 5C1.2. The five criteria are as follows:
(1) the defendant does not have more than [one] criminal history point, as
determined under the [Guidelines] before application of subsection (b) of § 4A1.3
(Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History Category);
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a
firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in
connection with the offense;
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person;
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others
in the offense, as determined under the sentencing Guidelines and was not
engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848; and
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully
provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has
concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or
of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or
useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the
information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant
has complied with this requirement.
USSG § 5C1.2(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
171. 713 F.3d at 85 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f(2); see also USSG § 5C1.2(a)(2).
172. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 85.
173. Id. at 85, 91; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); USSG §§ 2D1.1(b)(1), 5C1.2.
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firearm "was possessed.",1 4 The guideline commentary to USSG
§ 2D1.1, explains however, "[tihe enhancement should be applied if the
weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was
connected with the offense.""' The application of this commentary
illustrates another important distinction between the enhancement and
the safety valve-the burden of proof.
Although the burden of proving enhancements generally falls on the
government, the firearm enhancement is somewhat of a hybrid. Once
the government shows the "mere presence" of a firearm, there is "a
rebuttable presumption that a firearm, if present-just present, not
present in proximity to drugs-is 'connected with the offense.'"176 The
"heavy burden of negation" then falls on the defendant to "disprove a
connection with the drug offense to the extent of showing it is 'clearly
improbable' they were symbiotic."
To obtain safety valve relief, on the other hand, the defendant bears
the burden of proving that the five criteria have been satisfied by a
preponderance of evidence."' A defendant thus only needs to establish
that "it is more than likely" that the firearm was not possessed in
connection with the offense, as opposed to proving "it is clearly
improbable" that the firearm was possessed in connection with the
offense. 7 " "It does not deductively follow from a defendant's failure to
satisfy a higher quantum of proof on a particular issue that he cannot
satisfy a lower quantum of proof on that same issue."'8 o Accordingly,
in Carillo-Ayala,the Eleventh Circuit held that "not all defendants" who
are enhanced for possessing a firearm are precluded from safety valve
relief."' Rather, the sentencing court "must determine whether the
facts of the case show that a 'connection' between the firearm and the
offense, though possible, is not probable."'
In light of the lack of any definition of "in connection with" in the
safety valve statute or Guidelines, the Eleventh Circuit next explored
what constitutes a "connection" between the firearm and the drug
After lengthy discussion, the court concluded that, subject
offense."

174. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 89-91; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2); USSG
§ 5C1.2(aX2).
175. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 90 (quoting USSG § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11(A)).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting United States v. Bolka, 355 F.3d 909, 914 (6th Cir. 2004)).
181. Id. at 91.
182. Id.

183. Id. at 91-97; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2); USSG § 5C1.2(aX2).
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to negation by a preponderance of the evidence, the connection is established by the firearm's proximity to the drugs, as well as by the firearm's
facilitation of the drug offense." A firearm can facilitate the drug
offense, for example,
by emboldening an actor who had the ability to display or discharge the
weapon, by serving as an integral part of a drug transaction as in a
barter situation, by instilling confidence in others who relied on the
defendant, or serving as a "badge of office" to help the defendant avoid
detection."a
Applying this legal standard to the facts in Carillo-Ayala, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the denial of safety valve relief, stating that "[a]
defendant drug dealer who knows he is selling both drugs and guns to
a person he believes to be another drug dealer possesses the firearms he
sells 'in connection with' his drug offense, even if the guns and drugs are
'sold separately.'"'8 6
IV.

PRIOR CONVICTIONS

Prior convictions play an important role in all guideline calculations,
especially given that the criminal history category is based on the
number of criminal history points assigned to each prior conviction
under Part A of Chapter Four of the Guidelines Manual.' Additionally, drug, firearm, and immigration offenses are subject to severe
enhancements based on certain types of prior convictions, including
convictions for crimes of violence."e
A. CriminalHistory Calculations,ChapterFour,PartA, of the
Guidelines Manual
While criminal history points are assigned to all felony offenses,
certain misdemeanors listed in the Guidelines and "offenses similar to
them" are never counted or are only counted in certain circumstances.'8 9 The Eleventh Circuit addressed the "offenses similar to them"

184. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d at 96.
185. Id. (internal citations omitted).

186. Id. at 98.
187.
188.
§ 924(e)
189.

See USSG ch. 4, pt. A (2013).
See, e.g., USSG §§ 22.1(a)(1)-(4), 2L1.2(b), 4B1. 1, 4B1.4 (2013); see also 18 U.S.C.
(2012).
USSG § 4A1.2(c)(1)42) (2013).
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9 which involved the
language in United States v. Garcia-Sandobal,"'
Florida offense of disorderly intoxication.'
Disorderly intoxication is not among the excluded or excludable
offenses listed in the Guidelines.19 2 Public intoxication is never
counted."9 ' Disorderly conduct and disturbing the peace, however, are
listed as offenses that can be counted if they are similar to the instant
offense or if the defendant was sentenced to more than one year of
probation or at least thirty days of imprisonment."4 To determine
whether disorderly intoxication was more similar to public intoxication
or to disorderly conduct, the Eleventh Circuit noted in Garcia-Sandobal
that the Guidelines' "default rule for past offenses is one of inclusion,"' and that the defendant bears "the burden of showing that the
exception applies."'9 6 The court then turned to the guideline commentary, which sets forth a "common sense approach" based on five factors
relating to the punishment, seriousness, and elements of the offenses, as
well as the level of culpability and likelihood of recurring criminal
conduct, for determining whether an offense is "similar" to other
offenses.'
In its detailed analysis of those five factors, the Eleventh Circuit in
Garcia-Sandobaldecided that four factors weighed in favor of counting
the Florida offense of disorderly intoxication.'" The court also emphasized that under Florida law, as opposed to the law in other states,

190. 703 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2013).
191. Id. at 1279. The Florida statute for disorderly intoxication provides, "No person
in the state shall be intoxicated and endanger the safety of another person or property, and
no person in the state shall be intoxicated or drink any alcoholic beverage in a public place
or in or upon any public conveyance and cause a public disturbance." FLA. STAT.
§ 856.011(1) (2013).
192. See USSG § 4A1.2(c)(2).
193. See USSG § 4A1.2(c)(2).
194. See USSG § 4A1.2(cX1).
195. 703 F.3d at 1284 (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 634 F.3d 317,319 (5th Cir.
2011)).
196. Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez-Santos, 184 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 1999)).
197. See id. at 1284-85 (applying USSG § 4A1.2 cmt. n.12(A)). The guideline
commentary provides:
In determining whether an unlisted offense is similar to an offense listed in
subsection (cX1) or (c)(2), the court should use a common sense approach that
includes consideration of relevant factors such as (i) a comparison of punishments
imposed for the listed and unlisted offenses; (ii) the perceived seriousness of the
offense as indicated by the level of punishment; (iii) the elements of the offense;
(iv) the level of culpability involved; and (v) the degree to which the commission
of the offense indicates a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct.
USSG § 4A1.2 cmt. n.12(A).
198. 703 F.3d at 1285.
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disorderly intoxication "requires proof that the defendant 'endangered
[somelone or created a public disturbance.'""9 The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the sentencing court properly counted the defendant's
prior Florida conviction for disorderly intoxication in determining his
criminal history category. 00

B. Prior Conviction Enhancements, Generally
In addition to criminal history calculations, prior convictions are a
prevalent feature in several specific offense characteristic and criminal
history enhancements. In fact, a substantial portion of the published
Eleventh Circuit cases in 2013 addressed what type of prior convictions
qualify under the enhancement provisions applicable to drug, immigration, and firearm offenses. In United States v. Elliot,20 ' however, the
court addressed a threshold question regarding what constitutes a "prior
conviction" for purposes of the career-offender enhancement.202
The career-offender guideline, found in USSG § 4B1. 1,203 trumps the
drug guideline found in USSG § 2D1.1 if the defendant has at least two
prior convictions for a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense.2 04 The career-offender guideline defines a "prior felony
conviction" as "a prior adult federal or state conviction for an offense
punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
regardless of whether such offense is specifically designated as a felony
and regardless of the actual sentence imposed."20
In determining whether the defendant's prior Alabama youthful
offender adjudication counted as a "prior conviction" for career-offender
6 the Eleventh Circuit
purposes in Elliot,""
reaffirmed that federal law,

199. Id. at 1286 (alteration in original) (quoting Papalas v. State, 645 So. 2d 153, 155
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
200. Id. at 1289-90.
201. 732 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2013).
202. Id. at 1309 (interpreting USSG § 401.1).
203. USSG § 4B1.1.
204. Compare USSG § 4B1.1(a), with USSG § 2D1.1.
205. USSG § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (2013).
206. The court distinguished case law interpreting "conviction"under the Armed Career
Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 921(2012), because that statute specifically provides that
the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held determines what constitutes
a conviction. Elliot, 732 F.3d at 1313 n.5 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 921(aX20)). "This case
presents us with no occasion to address the interaction of the ACCA and [Alabama law],
and we express no opinion on the matter." Id.
Additionally, there was no question in Elliot whether the Alabama youthful offender
adjudication was an "adult conviction," which is a "conviction for an offense committed at
age eighteen or older." USSG § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1; Elliot, 732 F.3d at 1311. The defendant
in Elliot was twenty years old when he committed the Alabama offense. Id. The question,
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not state law, controls the definition of terms for federal-enhancement
purposes.20 7 The court thus stated that it was not bound by Alabama
law, which prohibited Alabama youthful offender adjudications from
counting as convictions.20 s Instead, relying heavily on its precedent
holding that defendants were deemed "convicted" under federal law if
they pled nolo contendere and adjudication was withheld,209 the court
held that "a youthful offender who pled guilty and was adjudicated" was
purposes, "even if state law does
likewise convicted for career-offender
210
'convicted."'
him
not consider

C. Prior-ConvictionEnhancements for Crimes of Violence
The predominant issue regarding prior convictions in Eleventh Circuit
precedent concerns the meaning of "crime of violence." Significant
enhancements predicated on prior convictions for crimes of violence are
found in the Chapter Two guidelines for immigration and firearm
offenses. 211 Additionally, drug offenses are subject to the Chapter Four
enhancement for career offenders if the defendant previously has been
convicted of crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses.2 12
Likewise, the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)213 drastically
increases the statutory penalties in firearm-possession cases if the
defendant has at least three prior convictions for violent felonies or
The Guidelines' definition of "crime of
serious drug offenses.21'
violence" is strikingly similar to the definition of "violent felony" in the

therefore, was not whether the youthful offender adjudication was an "adult conviction" but
rather whether it was "a conviction at all." Id. at 1311.
207. Elliot, 732 F.3d at 1310-13.
208. Id. at 1312-13; see also id. at 1311 (citation omitted) (noting that under Alabama
law, a youthful offender adjudication "shall not be deemed a conviction of crime; provided,
however, that if he is subsequently convicted of crime, the prior adjudication as youthful
offender shall be considered").
209. Id. at 1311-12 (relying upon United States v. Acosta, 287 F.3d 1034, 1036-37 (11th
Cir. 2002); United States v. Fernandez, 234 F.3d 1345, 1347-48 (11th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1522-23 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Jones, 910 F.2d
760, 761 (11th Cir. 1990)).
210. Id. at 1313.
211. See USSG §§ 2K2.1(a), 2L1.2(b).
212. See USSG § 4B1.1. In fiscal year 2012, drug offenders comprised 73.5% of the
offenders sentenced nationally as career offenders. 2012 Sourcebook ofFederalSentencing
Statistics, supra note 6, tbl. 22.
213. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2013).
214. Compare id. (providing a mandatory minimum of fifteen years and maximum of
life imprisonment), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(a) (providing for no mandatory minimum and a
statutory maximum of ten years).
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ACCA.21 Consequently, the terms are often used interchangeably, and
the Eleventh Circuit regularly relies upon ACCA precedent analyzing
violent felonies in Guideline decisions interpreting crimes of violence.ne
215. USSG § 4B1.2(a) defines "crimes of violence" for purposes of the career-offender
guideline as follows:
any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, that(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another.
USSG § 4B1.2(a). The firearm guideline also relies on this definition. See USSG § 2K2.1
cmt. n.1.
The ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), defines "violent felony" as follows:
any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act
of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or
destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if
committed by an adult, that(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).
The immigration guideline commentary defines "crimes of violence" as follows:
any of the following offenses under federal, state, or local law: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses (including where consent
to the conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where consent to the
conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced), statutory rape, sexual abuse of
a minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, burglary of a
dwelling, or any other offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another.
USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii).
216. See Spencer v. United States, 727 F.3d 1076, 1082 n.5 (11th Cir. 2013) (stating
that the court follows "the precedents that treat the definition of crime of violence as
virtually identical in the career offender and armed career criminal cases") (citing James
v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 206 (2007); United States v. Chitwood, 676 F.3d 971, 975
n.2 (11th Cir. 2012)); United States v. Hall, 714 F.3d 1270, 1272 (11th Cir. 2013)
(remarking on the court's reliance on cases interpreting the ACCA's residual clause when
interpreting the meaning of "crime of violence" for career-offender purposes "because the
§ 4B1.2 definition of'crime of violence' and ACCA's definition of'violent felony' are substantially the same") (quoting Chitwood, 676 F.3d at 975 n.2); Turner, 709 F.3d at 1335 n.4
("The definition of 'violent felony' under the ACCA is virtually identical to the definition
of 'crime of violence' for purposes of the career offender enhancement of § 41.1. . . 'so that
decisions about one apply to the other.'") (quoting Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293,
1309 n.16 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
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Notably, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted "violent
felony" under the ACCA in several recent decisions, which the Eleventh
Circuit applied in Guidelines cases in 2013.217 Most recently, Descamps v. United States 218 is of particular relevance, because the
Supreme Court clarified how and when to use the "modified categorical
approach" in determining whether a particular offense is a violent
felony.219
The crime-of-violence inquiry starts with the statutory elements of the
offense at issue. If the elements are such that every conviction for
violating that statute qualifies as a crime of violence, then the offense
is categorically a crime of violence.22 0 Some statutes, however, include
multiple offenses, some with and some without violent elements. Those
statutes are examined under the "modified categorical approach," which
allows the court to look to certain documents to determine whether the
prior conviction was based on the violent or nonviolent element.221
Those documents-commonly called "Shepard-documents" based on
Shepard v. United States" 2 --include charging documents, written plea
agreements, plea colloquy transcripts, and explicit factual findings made
by the trial judge and assented to by the defendant.22 ' As discussed
below, in 2013, the Eleventh Circuit applied both approaches in
analyzing various crimes to determine whether they fit within the crimeof-violence definition.
The crime-of-violence definition is generally examined in three parts:
the element clause, the enumerated offenses, and the residual
clause.224 While the enumerated offenses received little attention in

217. See, e.g., Spencer, 727 F.3d at 1092-1100 (applying Descamps v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 2276 (2013); Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011); Johnson v. United
States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008); Shepard v.
United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005)).
218. 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
219. Id. at 2281. See generally Donawa v. United States, 735 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir.
2013) (applying the modified categorical approach after Descamps).
220. See Spencer, 727 F.3d at 1092.
221. See id. at 1092-93.
222. 544 U.S. 13 (2005); see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
223. See Spencer, 727 F.3d at 1093 (citing Chitwood, 676 F.3d at 976).
224. See USSG § 4B1.2 (2013).
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2013,225 the element and residual clauses were fiercely litigated in
connection with numerous crimes, primarily Florida offenses.
1. Element Clause. The element clause of the crime-of-violence
definition includes any felony that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another."2 26 The element clause is worded identically in the ACCA, the
career-offender guideline, and the immigration guideline.22 7 In 2013,
the Eleventh Circuit applied that clause in analyzing several offenses,
four of which were felony variations of the Florida offense of simple
battery. 228
In Florida, simple battery-essentially the touching or striking
another without consent 2 2 -becomes a felony if other elements are
added, such as a prior battery conviction, the victim's status as a law
enforcement officer or pregnant woman, the causation of great bodily
harm, or the use of a deadly weapon.so In Johnson v. United
States,"a' the United States Supreme Court held that Florida's felonybattery offense is not categorically a crime of violence under the element
clause, because it can be committed by touching or striking, and
touching is not the use of "violent force-that is, force capable of causing
physical pain or injury to another person." 232
In Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI,2 " the Eleventh Circuit examined
the Florida offenses of battery on a law enforcement officer and

225. In United States v. Weeks, 711 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2013), the Eleventh Circuit
held that the charging documents established the defendant's prior Florida convictions
qualified as "generic" burglaries under the ACCA's enumerated-offenses clause. Id. at
1262; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012) (enumerating "burglary, arson, or extortion,
involves use of explosives"); see also USSG § 4B1.2(a) (enumerating the same offenses with
the only difference being that the statute refers to "burglary," while the guideline refers
to "burglary of a dwelling"); accord USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (expanding the
enumerated offenses to include "murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault,
forcible sex offenses (including where consent to the conduct is not given or is not legally
valid, such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced),
statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension
of credit, burglary of a dwelling").
226. See USSG § 4B1.2(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B); USSG § 2L1.2 cmt.
n. 1(BXiii).
227. See supra notes 188, 203, 213. USSG §§ 4B1.1, 2L1.2.
228. See, e.g., Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI, 709 F.3d 1328, 1339 (11th Cir. 2013).
229. See FLA. STAT. § 784.03(1)(a) (2013).
230. See FLA. STAT. §§ 784.03(3), 784.07(2)(b), 784.045 (2013).
231. 559 U.S. 133 (2010).
232. Id. at 140 (emphasis omitted).
233. 709 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2013). Turner was decided before Descamps. See
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. 2276; Turner, 709 F.3d 1328.
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aggravated battery, in light of Johnson.2" The Eleventh Circuit
distinguished Johnson because the record there established nothing
more than the least culpable element of battery, namely, touching; thus,
the modified categorical approach was not determinative of whether the
defendant had been convicted of battery under the striking element, as
opposed to the touching element."' The evidence in Turner, on the
other hand, established the striking element. The Eleventh Circuit thus
determined that the Florida offense of battery on a law enforcement
officer, when committed by striking, qualifies as a violent felony under
the element clause.2 36 Moreover, the court held that two other Florida
aggravated battery offenses"' categorically qualify as violent felonies
because the added elements of causing great bodily harm or using a
deadly weapon involve the use of physical force within the meaning of
the element clause.2 38
As in 'Arner, the Eleventh Circuit applied the modified categorical
23 9
in analyzing whether
approach in United States v. Diaz-Calderone
the defendant was convicted of aggravated battery on a pregnant victim
by touching or striking.20 In affirming the crime-of-violence enhancement under the element clause in the immigration guideline commentary, the court determined that the offense involved striking the
pregnant victim.2 41
Aggravated assault was yet another Florida offense addressed in
Turner.242 Florida defines "assault" as "an intentional, unlawful threat
by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an
apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a wellfounded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent."243
Aggravated assault is assault combined with a deadly weapon or intent

234. Turner, 709 F.3d at 1337 n.5; see FLA. STAT. §§ 784.07(2)(b), 784.045 (2013).
235. See Turner, 709 F.3d at 1339 (citing Johnson, 559 U.S. at 144-45).
236. Id. at 1340. As discussed further below, the court also opined that battery on a
law enforcement officer qualifies as a crime of violence under the residual clause. Id.
(citing Rozier v. United States, 701 F.3d 681, 682 (11th Cir. 2012)).
237. See FLA. STAT. § 784.045.
238. Turner, 709 F.3d at 1341 & n.7 ("Doubtless, Florida aggravated battery would also
qualify as a violent felony under the residual clause. But because Turner's conviction for
aggravated battery so obviously qualifies as a violent felony under the elements clause, we
need not dwell on that issue to resolve this case." (internal citation omitted)).
239. 716 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2013). Like Turner, Diaz-Calderonewas decided before
Descamps. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. 2276; Daiz-Calderone,716 F.3d 1345.
240. Diaz-Calderone,716 F.3d at 1347.
241. Id.
242.

Turner, 709 F.3d at 1331.

243. FLA. STAT. § 784.011 (2013); see also Turner, 709 F.3d at 1337-38.
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to commit a felony.2" Based on the statutory elements of aggravated
assault, the court concluded that the offense was categorically a crime
of violence under the element clause. 5
And finally, in Garcia-Sandobal,the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that
the Florida offense of resisting an officer with violence" qualifies as
a crime of violence under the element clause of the illegal-reentry
guideline."
2. Residual Clause. The residual clause in the career-offender
guideline and the ACCA adds to the crime-of-violence definition any
felony that "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another.""' The only difference between the
residual clause in the career-offender guideline and in the ACCA is that
the guideline has commentary, whereas the ACCA does not. That
difference was the deciding factor in United States v. Hall?
The Eleventh Circuit previously held that possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun is not a violent felony under the ACCA because

244. FLA. STAT. § 784.021 (2013); see also Turner, 709 F.3d at 1337.
245. Turner, 709 F.3d at 1337-38 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2013)); see also
id. at 1338 n.6 (opining that the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, which
involved a firearm, also would qualify under the modified categorical approach, given that
Eleventh Circuit precedent held that assault with a deadly weapon falls within "the generic
crime of aggravated assault," thereby qualifying as a crime of violence or violent felony)
(quoting United States v. Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotations omitted)).
246. See FLA. STAT. § 843.01 (2013).
247. Garcia-Sandobal,703 F.3d at 1283 (citing United States v. Romo-Villalobos, 674
F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2012)); see also USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(BXiii).
248. USSG § 4B1.2(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B); USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. 1(B)(iii).
Although the "crime of violence" definition in the commentary to the illegal-reentry
guideline does not include a residual clause, another enhancement under that guideline,
based on a prior conviction for an "aggravated felony," invokes similar language. See
United States v. Coronado-Cura, 713 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2013), discussed in notes 282-298
and accompanying text.
The ACCA's residual clause was subject to several challenges in 2013 Eleventh Circuit
precedent. See, e.g., Weeks, 711 F.3d at 1258-60 (rejecting the argument that the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments require the jury, not the judge, to find the "circumstance-specific facts"
concerning whether prior convictions were "committed on occasions different from one
another"-thus qualifying as ACCA predicates-provided that the sentencing court limit
itself to Shepard-approved sources); accord United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627,
635-36 (11th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Gandy, 710 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir.
2013) (rejecting the argument that the ACCA's residual clause is unconstitutionally vague);
accord Weeks, 711 F.3d at 1262.
249. 714 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2013).
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it is not "similar in kind" to the enumerated offenses.250 Unlike the
ACCA, however, the Guidelines contain commentary that explicitly
states that the unlawful possession of a sawed-off rifle or shotgun is a
crime of violence.2 5' In Hall, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
commentary was binding and authoritative, thereby compelling the
conclusion that possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun is a
crime of violence for purposes of the career-offender guideline.252
In Begay v. United States"', the Supreme Court held that even if a
crime involves a serious potential risk of physical injury, to qualify
under the residual clause, the crime must be "roughly similar, in kind
as well as in degree of risk posed," to the enumerated crimes in the
statute and must involve "purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct."2 54 After Begay, however, the Supreme Court decided Sykes v.
United StateS2 55 and "resuscitated the serious-potential-risk-of-physical-injury test and limited Begay's requirement of purposeful, violent,
and aggressive conduct to crimes that are 'akin to strict liability,
negligence, and recklessness crimes."'2 56
The Eleventh Circuit also addressed Begay and Sykes in Trner, a
post-conviction appeal. There, the court held that the Florida offense of
shooting into an occupied building5 categorically qualifies under the
residual clause, because a serious potential risk of physical injury exists
whenever "a person wantonly or maliciously shoots or throws any deadly
missile at any building" regardless of whether the building is occupied.258 Additionally, after ruling that Florida's battery on a law
250. See United States v. McGill, 618 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying the
test set forth in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. '137 (2008)).
251. See USSG § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1.
252. See Hall, 714 F.3d at 1272-74 (citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38
(1993)).
253. 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
254. Id. at 143, 145 (internal quotes omitted).
255. 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011).
256. Id. at 2276.
257. See FLA. STAT. § 790.19 (2013) (providing that " [wihoever, wantonly or maliciously,
shoots at, within, or into, or throws any [deadly] missile ... at, within, or in any public or
private building, occupied or unoccupied ... shall be guilty of a felony"); State v. Kettell,
980 So. 2d 1061, 1067 (Fla. 2008) (ruling that for purposes of § 790.19, "'wantonly' means
... with the knowledge that damage is likely to be done to some person," and "'[ml aliciously' means wrongfully, intentionally,. . . and with the knowledge that injury or damage wil
or may be caused to another person or the property of another person").
258. Turner, 709 F.3d at 1338-39. The court added that in Turner the offense also
would qualify under the modified categorical approach, because
though the locus of our inquiry is actually the elements of the offense as it is
committed in "the ordinary case" rather than the underlying facts of a particular
offense, one can hardly quarrel with the proposition that, where an individual
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enforcement officer qualified under the element clause based on the
modified categorical approach, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "because
the risk of serious physical injury attendant to battery on a law
enforcement officer renders the crime a potential hotbed of melee and
violence, it easily qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual
clause."25 9 This conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit opined, following the
holding in Sykes that vehicular flight from a law enforcement officer
qualified under the residual clause, in part because "[clonfrontation with
police is the expected result of vehicle flight as] [i]t places property and
persons at serious risk of injury."'260 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit
ruled that "if vehicular fleeing from law enforcement is a violent felony
because of its potential risk of physical confrontation, a crime that a
fortiori involves that very confrontation with police is most assuredly a
violent felony, too."261
The Eleventh Circuit also relied on Sykes in United States v.
Petite,2 62 which involved the Florida offense of "simple vehicle flight"
from a law enforcement officer, without driving recklessly or at a high
speed. 263 According to the Eleventh Circuit,
the Supreme Court made it clear in Sykes that intentional vehicle
ffight from a law enforcement officer is an inherently risky offense,
that the offense by definitional necessity occurs in the presence of a
law enforcement officer and provokes a dangerous confrontational
response from that officer, and that this confrontational response
places property and persons at serious risk both during and after the
pursuit, even without any reckless driving on the part of the offender.26

wantonly or maliciously discharges a weapon at a building, such conduct "presents
a serious potential risk of injury to another."
Id. at 1339 (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007)).
259. Id. at 1341 (emphasis omitted).
260. Id. (quoting Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2274) (first alteration in original).
261. Id.
262. 703 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2013).
263. Id. at 1292-93. Section 316.1935(2) of the Florida Statutes provides, "[Any person
who willfully flees or attempts to elude a law enforcement officer in an authorized law
enforcement patrol vehicle, with agency insignia and other jurisdictional markings
prominently displayed on the vehicle, with siren and lights activated commits a felony of
the third degree," punishable by not more than five years of imprisonment. FLA. STAT.
§ 316.1935(2) (2013).
264. Petite, 703 F.3d at 1301 (citing Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2273-74).
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The court in Petite thus held that Florida's simple vehicle flight offense
qualifies under the residual clause."'
In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit announced that Sykes undermined
to the point of abrogation the court's post-Begay, pre-Sykes precedent in
266
United States v. Harrison,
which held that "simple vehicle
flight"-as opposed to "aggravated vehicle flight"-was not a violent
felony.2 67 Although the Supreme Court noted in Sykes that the
decision under review "was in conflict with" Harrison, the Supreme
Court expressly left open the question whether simple vehicle flight is
a violent felony where the state legislature has classified that offense as
a lesser-included offense with significantly lesser penalties than
aggravated vehicle flight."
Unlike the Indiana statute at issue in
Sykes, the Florida statute provides tiered penalties for vehicle flight,
punishing aggravated vehicle flight by up to fifteen years, but assigning
a statutory maximum of five years to the lesser included offense of
simple vehicle flight."'
Notwithstanding, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that its decision would not be "dispositively altered by any
difference between Florida's and Indiana's punitive determinations."7 o
3. Aggravated Felonies. In addition to the crime-of-violence
enhancement discussed above,"" the immigration guideline contains
an aggravated-felony enhancement, which is similar to the "crime of
violence" enhancement, but requires the addition of fewer offense

265. Id.; see also Gandy, 710 F.3d at 1238-39 (relying on Petite in ruling that the
conviction for "simple vehicle flight in violation of FLA. STAT. § 316.1935(2) is a predicate
offense under the ACCA").
266. 558 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2009).
267. Harrison, 558 F.3d at 1296; Petite, 703 F.3d at 1297-99; see also United States v.
Harris, 586 F.3d 1283, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that aggravated vehicle
flight-willfully fleeing or eluding police officer at high speed or with wanton disregard for
safety of persons or property-is a crime of violence).
268. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2272, 2277 (declining the governments request to"go further
and deem it irrelevant under the residual clause whether a crime is a lesser included
offense even in cases where that offense carries a less severe penalty than the offense that
includes it" because "the case at hand does not present the occasion to decide that
question").
269. Compare IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3 (2004 & Supp. 2008) with FLA. STAT. § 316.1935.
270. Petite, 703 F.3d at 1301.
271. See supra Part IV.C.1.; see also USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (providing a sixteen-level
enhancement if the prior conviction for the crime of violence received criminal history
points, or a twelve-level enhancement if no criminal history points were applied to the
crime-of-violence conviction).
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levels.272 The meaning of an "aggravated felony" was addressed in
United States v. Coronado-Cura,""where the Eleventh Circuit held
that simple vehicle flight qualifies as an aggravated felony.274
In deciding to extend "Petite'sextension of Sykes" to the aggravatedfelony enhancement, the Eleventh Circuit compared the ACCA's
definition of "violent felony" to the Guideline's definition of "aggravated
felony."'
The definition of "aggravated felony" is more complicated
that the definition of "crime of violence."2 76 Instead of explicitly
defining "aggravated felony," as it does "crime of violence," the immigration guideline commentary refers to the definition of that term found in
8 U.S.C. § 1101(aX43). 277 That statute defines "aggravated felony" by
listing myriad offenses and categories of offenses, 2 78 including a "crime
of violence." 7' The "crime of violence" definition in § 1101(aX43)(F)
refers to 18 U.S.C. § 16,280 which includes any felony that "involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of
another may be used in the course of committing the offense.""

272. See USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) (providing an eight-level enhancement if the prior
conviction is for an aggravated felony).
273. 713 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2013).
274. Id. at 597 (applying USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C)).
275. Id. at 599-600. The immigration guideline's enhancements for an aggravated
felony and a crime of violence are similar, but contain important differences. For example,
an aggravated felony enhancement is less severe than the crime of violence enhancement,
and the two enhancements are mutually exclusive. Compare USSG § 2L1.2(bX1XA)
(adding sixteen offense levels for a prior crime of violence conviction), with USSG
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) (adding eight levels for a prior aggravated felony conviction); see also
USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n.3(B). Also, a prior aggravated felony conviction counts, regardless
of when the conviction occurred or whether it resulted in criminal history points under
Chapter Four; whereas a prior crime of violence conviction only counts for enhancement
purposes if it counts for criminal history points. Compare USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(C), with
USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n.3(A).
276. See, e.g., Coronado-Cura,713 F.3d at 599 (noting that to find the definition of
"aggravated felony" for purposes of USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), one must travel a "circuitous
route").
277. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012); see also USSG § 2L1.2 cmt. n.3(A) ("For purposes
of subsection (b)(1)(C), 'aggravated felony' has the meaning given that term in section
1101(aX43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)), without regard
to the date of conviction for the aggravated felony.").
278. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U).
279. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43XF).
280. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2013); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (providing that an
"aggravated felony" means "a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18, but not
including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one
year").
281. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). The definition of "crime of violence" in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) is
identical to the element clause in the Guidelines and the ACCA, except that 18 U.S.C.
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In Coronado-Cura,the Eleventh Circuit opined that the definitions of
"aggravated felony" and "violent felony" are similar, in that "both focus
on the risk that is created by the criminal conduct" with "no material
difference" in the risk levels. 282 The definition of "aggravated felony,"
however, is broader than the definition of a "violent felony" and "crime
of violence" because the aggravated-felony enhancement protects "'the
person or property of another' from physical force, while the ACCA
enhances punishment to protect against 'physical injury to another' but
not to property."2
Furthermore, because the "aggravated felony"
definition does not contain enumerated offenses, unlike the ACCA and
the career-offender guideline, 21 the risk associated with an "aggravated felony" need not be "comparable" to the risk posed by burglary, arson,
extortion, and use of explosives.2 85
Notwithstanding, the defendant in Coronado-Curaargued that the

aggravated felony definition is narrower than the "crime of violence"
definition, because unlike the "crime of violence" definition, the risk of
physical force for an aggravated felony must occur "in the course of
committing the offense."2 " The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, explaining
that the physical force underlying the aggravated-felony enhancement
need not "come from the offender [because] the risk the [Guidelines] seek
to avoid is the risk that force will be used against the person or property
of another, and force is force regardless of whether it comes from the
fleeing offender or the pursuing officers."
In affirming the aggravated-felony enhancement in Coronado-Cura,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded, "any crime that is an ACCA violent
felony is also a [USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C)] aggravated felony; the Florida
crime of simple vehicle flight is an ACCA violent felony; therefore, that
crime is also a § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) aggravated felony."288
8 the Eleventh Circuit addressed
In United States v. Garza-Mendez,"
another nuance in the aggravated felony definition.2 90 The issue there
was not whether the Georgia offense of family-violence battery was a
"crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16, such as to qualify for the

§ 16(a) also includes physical force against the "property of another." Compare 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(a), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) and USSG §§ 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii), 4B1.2(a).
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

713 F.3d at 599.
Id.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16, with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(BXii) and USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2).
See Coronado-Cura,713 F.3d at 600.
Id.
Id.
Id.; USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C).
735 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1286.
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aggravated-felony enhancement. Rather, the issue was whether the
sentence actually imposed for that conviction was a "term of imprisonment" of "at least one year," as required for a "crime of violence" to
qualify as an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). 291
In this regard, a "term of imprisonment" is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48XB) 2" to include "the period of incarceration or confinement ordered
by a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or
execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part."2 11
In Garza-Mendez, the original state court sentencing document
indicated that the defendant was sentenced to confinement in a
correctional facility for twelve months, but after serving thirty hours,
with thirty hours of credit for time served, the remainder could be served
on probation.294 Thereafter, the defendant was arrested on the instant
federal immigration charge. To demonstrate that his prior sentence was
not "at least one year" in prison, the defendant sought clarification from
the state court. A state judge-not the judge who imposed the sentence-then reviewed the sentence and issued a "clarification order,"
stating that the defendant was sentenced to twelve months of probation,
with the first thirty hours to be served in custody and credit for thirty
hours already served.'
The court concluded, that the defendant was
not sentenced to twelve months of incarceration."
The Eleventh
Circuit rejected the "subjective, interpretive clarification order,"
emphasizing that "a federal judge is in a better position to interpret the
state-sentence order regarding its effect on [a defendant's] federal
sentence under federal law than another state judge, who did not impose
his sentence."'
In deciding that the defendant's prior sentence in Garza-Mendez
qualified as a term of imprisonment of at least one year, the Eleventh
Circuit relied on the statutory definition of "term of imprisonment,"
which includes suspended sentences.2 " Also, the court reaffirmed its
precedent interpreting "term of imprisonment" for purposes of the
aggravated-felony enhancement as including "all parts of a sentence of
imprisonment from which the sentencing court excuses the defendant,

291. See id. at 1288; see also United States v. Guzman-Bera, 216 F.3d 1019, 1020 (11th
Cir. 2000) (holding that "an aggravated felony is defined by the sentence actually
imposed").
292. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B).
293. Id.
294. See Garza-Mendez, 735 F.3d at 1286-87, 1293 (appendix).
295. Id. at 1286-87.
296. Id. at 1287.
297. Id. at 1288.
298. Id. at 1287 (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B)).
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even if the court itself follows state-law usage and describes the excuse
with a word other than 'suspend."'"
The Eleventh Circuit therefore
affirmed the aggravated felony enhancement in Garza-Mendez.so
V. SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS
Reasonableness issues generally arise in appeals by defendants in the
context of a sentence within or above the guideline range; whereas
below-guideline sentences are usually the subject of government appeals.
In fiscal year 2012, approximately one-fourth of the sentencing appeals
filed by defendants, nationally, challenged the reasonableness of the
sentence imposed.3 0 The sentences in 96.8% of those appeals were
affirmed.o 2 In contrast, the affirmance rate for government appeals
raising reasonableness challenges was only 68.4%.ao
Both of the
government's sentencing appeals in the Eleventh Circuit that were
analyzed by the Sentencing Commission in 2012 were sustained, yielding
a 100% reversal rate upon appeal. 304 Eleventh Circuit precedent
reveals that this trend did not continue into 2013.
Within-guideline sentences account for more than half of the sentences
imposed in the Eleventh Circuit's jurisdiction, as well as nationally.o
Although the Eleventh Circuit has not adopted a presumption that
within-guideline sentences are reasonable, the court "ordinarily expect [s]
such a sentence to be reasonable."ce It should not be unexpected,
therefore, that the court rejected every substantive reasonableness
challenge to sentences that were within the guideline range in 2013.
For example, in United States v. Joseph,o7 the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed, as reasonable, a within-guideline sentence of 360 months for

299. Id. at 1289 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Ayala-Gomez, 255 F.3d
1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001)).
300. Id.
301. 2012 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, supra note 6, tbl. 57. The
Sentencing Commission considered the 5928 appeals in which defendants presented at
least one sentencing issue. Id. In those appeals, 3021 (25.3%) involved reasonableness
challenges. Id.
302. Id. The Eleventh Circuit statistics are fairly consistent with the national statistics
regarding the affirmance rate for all appeals by defendants. Id. at tbl. 56 (revealing that
nationally, 73.5% of sentencing appeals by defendants were affirmed, and that in the
Eleventh Circuit, 75.2% were affirmed).
303. Id. at tbl. 58. The Sentencing Commission analyzed sixty government appeals,
of which 17.8% raised reasonableness issues. Id.
304. Id. at tbl. 56A.
305. See supra note 6.
306. Victor, 719 F.3d at 1291 (citing United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th
Cir. 2008)); accord United States v. Joseph, 709 F.3d 1082, 1105 (11th Cir. 2013).
307. 709 F.3d 1082 (11th Cir. 2013).
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a doctor convicted of various drug offenses relating to the operation of a
"pill mill."308 Of significance, the court noted that the sentence
imposed was at the bottom of the guideline range, and that the
maximum statutory and guideline penalties were "much more severe"
than the sentence imposed.0 '
In Victor, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the total sentence of 121
months, consisting of 37 months for robbery, consecutive to the
mandatory 84-month sentence for brandishing a firearm in furtherance
of that robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).xo The
guideline range for the robbery was 37 to 46 months.31' In light of the
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which the sentencing
court "carefully considered," the Eleventh Circuit held that the
sentencing court's "failure to impose a below- [guideline] sentence" was
not unreasonable. 312 Likewise, in Garza-Mendez, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the within-guideline sentence of twenty months of imprisonment for illegally reentering the United States, as well as the sentencing
court's refusal to depart below the Guidelines based on cultural
assimilation."'3
Similarly, no 2013 precedent vacated an above-guideline sentence as
substantively unreasonable. For example, in United States v. McKinley,"' the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a total sentence of 209 months of
imprisonment, consisting of the mandatory and consecutive 84-month
sentence for brandishing a firearm in furtherance of that robbery, plus
125 months for interfering with commerce.1
The Eleventh Circuit
upheld the 125-month sentence, even though it was more than double
the nadir of the guideline range of 57 to 71 months, on two alternative
bases.316
First, the court opined that given the defendant's extensive criminal
history, the sentencing court could have reasonably departed upward
based on USSG § 4A1.3(a)(1),31 ' which provides that where "the
defendant's criminal history category substantially underrepresents the
seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the
defendant will commit other crimes, an upward departure may be

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id. at 1087-88, 1105.
Id. at 1105.
719 F.3d at 1289-90; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).
719 F.3d at 1290; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
719 F.3d at 1291.
735 F.3d at 1291.
732 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1295.
Id. at 1294, 1299.
USSG § 4A1.3(a)(1) (2013).
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warranted."s"s Alternatively, the Eleventh Circuit concluded, the 125month sentence was a reasonable upward variance, given the sentencing
court's consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and the statutory
maximum of 240 months.3 19
In like manner, in United States v. Overstreet,320 the Eleventh
Circuit upheld a 420-month sentence for possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, which was double the high end of the guideline range of
180 to 210 months.3 21 The defendant appealed the reasonableness of
the sentence, arguing that the sentencing court focused almost exclusively on the defendant's criminal history.322 The Eleventh Circuit rejected
that argument, stating, "[a]lthough the district court must evaluate all
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors in imposing a sentence, it is permitted to
attach great weight to one factor over others." 3 23
The Eleventh Circuit also dismissed the argument that the sentencing
court "triple-counted" the defendant's prior convictions by using them to
enhance the statutory penalties under the ACCA, to depart upward
under USSG § 4A1.3, and to vary upwards.324 The Eleventh Circuit
iterated that "a district court can rely on factors in imposing a variance
that it had already considered in imposing [a guideline] enhancement. 3 25 The Eleventh Circuit further noted that "any alleged error
in using Overstreet's prior convictions to depart upwards under [USSG
§ 4A1.3 was harmless" because the sentencing court stated that it would
have imposed the same sentence regardless of the departure under
USSG § 4A1.3.326
The below-guideline sentences, however, met with a different fate, as
illustrated in United States v. McQueen,327 where the defendants were
former correctional officers.328 One defendant (Dawkins) was convicted
of obstruction of justice, faced a guideline range of 15 to 21 months, and

318. Id.; see also McKinley, 732 F.3d at 1298.
319. McKinley, 732 F.3d at 1299; see also id. (noting that "a further indicator the
sentence was reasonable" is that the sentence was "well below the statutory maximum").
320. 713 F.3d 627 (11th Cir. 2013).
321. Id. at 634, 636-40.
322. Id. at 638.
323. Id. (quoting United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th
Cir.2007) ("The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to
the sound discretion of the district court. . . .") (quoting United States v. Williams, 456
F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 2006)).
324. Overstreet, 713 F.3d at 639.
325. Id. (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010)).
326. Id. at 639 n.15.
327. 727 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir. 2013).
328. Id. at 1147.
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The other defendant (Mcwas sentenced to one month in prison.'
Queen) was convicted of obstructing justice and conspiring to violate
prisoners' civil rights, faced a guideline range was 151 to 188 months,
and was sentenced to 12 months of imprisonment."so
In vacating the below-guideline sentences in McQueen, the Eleventh
Circuit conducted a lengthy review on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors."a' Acknowledging the sentencing court's "great discretion in
balancing the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors," the Eleventh Circuit
nonetheless stated that sentencing courts must afford "some weight to
the factors in a manner that is at least loosely commensurate with their
importance to the case, and in a way that 'achieve[s] the purposes of
The sentencing court
sentencing stated in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)."' 3
in McQueen, however, "focused virtually exclusively on one factor-unwarranted disparities" in arriving at "sentences falling profoundly outside the range of reasonable sentences.",3 Hence, "after balancing the factors," the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the sentencing court
"arrived at two unreasonable sentences and in the process abused its
considerable discretion."3
Withal, in United States v. Kuhlman,"' the Eleventh Circuit reversed the time-served sentence, where the guideline range was 57 to 71
months, and the government recommended a 36-month sentence based
on the plea agreement.3 ' The defendant, a doctor, was convicted of a
$3 million health-care-fraud scheme.3 3 ' The sentencing court was
impressed that before sentencing, the defendant paid the restitution in
full, noting that he was the first defendant that the court could recall
"who made such a large restitution payment prior to sentencing.""
The sentencing court also lauded the defendant's momentous community
service, which was performed before sentencing.339

329. Id. at 1149-50.
330. Id. at 1150. A third codefendant, who did not appeal, faced a statutory maximum
of one year in prison because he pled guilty to the misdemeanor offense of depriving an
inmate of a constitutional right, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012). He was sentenced
to one year of imprisonment. McQueen, 727 F.3d at 1149.
331. McQueen, 727 F.3d at 1156-61.
332. Id. at 1160 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179,
1203 (11th Cir. 2008)).
333. Id. at 1161.
334. Id. at 1157.
335. 711 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2013).
336. Id. at 1323, 1325.
337. Id. at 1323.
338. Id. at 1325.
339. Id. at 1325-26.
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Noting that the sentencing court cited several 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors in support of the downward variance, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that the sentence in Kuhlman was procedurally reasonable.34 0 However, the court decided that the sentence was substantively unreasonable in that it failed "to achieve an important goal of
sentencing in a white-collar crime prosecution: the need for general
deterrence." "
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the "unjustified
reliance on a single factor 'may be a symptom of an unreasonable
sentence."'04 ' Regardless, Eleventh Circuit precedent holds that "Itihe
weight to be accorded any given [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factor is a matter
committed to the sound discretion of the district court, and we will not
substitute our judgment in weighing the relevant factors." "
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the sentence did "not
reflect the seriousness and extent of the crime, nor does it promote
respect for the law, provide just punishment, or adequately deter other
similarly inclined health care providers.""
The sentence therefore
was vacated, and the case was remanded to allow the district court the
opportunity "to impose a reasonable sentence."3 4 5
The results of these substantive reasonableness challenges are
consistent with previous years, prompting the observation in a recent
concurring opinion that Eleventh Circuit precedent approaches
34
above-guideline and below-guideline sentences differently.6
In
reviewing sentences above the guideline range, the Eleventh Circuit
"look[s] only to whether the sentencing court seemed to consider the [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a-) factors and ... ignorels] whether the court might have
disregarded one of the factors or weighed the factors in an unreasonable
way." 7 In reviewing sentences below the guideline range, on the
other hand, the court "show [s] no such deference and instead scrutinize[s] how a sentencing court applied each and every [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) factor." 48 In light of this trend, concern has been expressed

340. Id. at 1327-28.
341. Id. at 1328.
342. Id. at 1327 (quoting Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191).
343. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823,
832 (11th Cir. 2007)).
344. Id. at 1329.
345. Id. at 1330.
346. United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (11th Cir. 2012) (Martin, J.,
concurring).
347. Id. (citing Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1241; Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 834; United States
v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007)).
348. Id. at 1223-24 (citing United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1118-19 (11th Cir.
2011); United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Pugh, 515 F.3d
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that the court's "different approach for reviewing up and down sentence
variances may erode public trust in our work.""'
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Guidelines remained at the forefront of the precedential sentencing decisions in the Eleventh Circuit in 2013. As the Eleventh Circuit
emphasized in 2013, "[tlhe Guidelines are the heart of the substantive
law of federal sentencing."3 o1 Yet, after more than a quarter of a
century,as' the Guidelines remain a work in progress. They are
interpreted every year and subsequently amended, re-interpreted, and
re-amended. This precedent generated by the Eleventh Circuit in 2013
is part of that ongoing evolution.

at 1203).
349. Id. at 1225.
350. Spencer, 727 F.3d at 1087; see also Peugh, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (stating that the
Guidelines are "the lodestone of sentencing"); Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50 (stating that the
Guidelines "should be the starting point and the initial benchmark" in federal sentencing
proceedings).
351. The Guidelines first went into effect on November 1, 1987. See USSG ch.1, pt.A,
at 1 (2013).

